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FINANCE AND WELFARE : THE IMPACT OF
TWO WORLD WARS ON DOMESTIC POLICY
IN FRANCE
Fathers, families, and the state in France, 1914–1945. By Kristen Stromberg Childers. Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 2003. Pp. 261. ISBN 0-8014-4122-6. £23.95.
Origins of the French welfare state : the struggle for social reform in France, 1914–1947. By Paul
V. Dutton. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 251. ISBN 0-521-81334-4.
£49.99.
Britain, France, and the ﬁnancing of the First World War. By Martin Horn. Montreal and
Kingston: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 2002. Pp. 249. ISBN 0-7735-2293-X. £65.00.
The gold standard illusion : France, the Bank of France and the International Gold Standard, 1914–1939.
By Kenneth Moure´. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. 297. ISBN 0-19-924904-0.
£40.00.
Workers’ participation in post-Liberation France. By Adam Steinhouse. Lanham: Lexington
Books, 2001. Pp. 245. ISBN 0-7391-0282-6. $70.00 (hb). ISBN 0-7391-0283-4. $24.95 (pbk).
In the traditional historiography of twentieth-century France the period after the Second
World War is usually contrasted favourably with that after 1918. After 1945, new men with
new ideas, born out of the shock of defeat in 1940 and resistance to Nazi occupation, laid
the basis for an economic and social democracy.1 The welfare state was created, women
were given full voting rights, and French security, in both economic and territorial respects,
was partially guaranteed by integrating West Germany into a new supranational insti-
tutional structure in Western Europe. 1945 was to mark the beginning of the ‘30 glorious
years ’ of peace and prosperity enjoyed by an expanding population in France.2 In sharp
contrast, the years after 1918 are characterized as a period dominated by France’s failed
attempts to restore its status as a great power. Policies based on making the German
taxpayer ﬁnance France’s restoration are blamed for contributing to the great depression
after 1929 and the rise of Hitler. However, as more research is carried out into the
social and economic reconstruction of France after both world wars, it is becoming clear
that the basis of what was to become the welfare state after 1945 was laid in the aftermath
of the First World War. On the other hand, new reforms adopted in 1945 which did
not build on interwar policies, such as those designed to give workers a voice in decision-
making at the workplace, proved to be short-lived. The aim of restoring France as a great
power, which was every bit as central to governments after 1945 as after 1918, did not
depend on granting workers’ rights at the workplace.
France emerged from the First World War victorious, but impoverished in both human
and ﬁnancial terms. The high level of domestic and foreign debts largely incurred to
1 Andrew Shennan, Rethinking France : plans for renewal, 1940–1946 (Oxford, 1989).
2 Jean Fourastie´, Les trente glorieuses : ou la Re´volution invisible de 1946 a` 1975 (Paris, 1979).
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pay for the war seriously weakened France’s international inﬂuence after 1918.3 While
considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to analysing French diplomatic eﬀorts
to reassert that inﬂuence, much less is known about how France’s ﬁnancial and demo-
graphic condition aﬀected domestic policy. All but one of the books reviewed below
consider the impact of the First World War on French domestic policy. In many respects,
it was the way in which the First World War had been ﬁnanced which was to shape
French policy in the 1920s and beyond. Since France already had the largest debt of
all the industrialized countries on the eve of the First World War, partly due to the
war indemnities imposed by Germany after the Franco-Prussian war, as well as having
the greatest tax burden to service that debt, war-time governments were reluctant to
increase taxes still further to pay for the First World War.4 Thus, although a new system
of income tax had been approved by the French parliament in the spring of 1914, its
introduction was postponed until 1917, when the opposition of the Senate was ﬁnally
overcome. As a result, as Martin Horn shows, the size of France’s domestic debt soared
during the war years ; indeed, only 15 per cent of war-time expenditure was covered
by government receipts (p. 83). Foreign indebtedness also spiralled. At the time of the
armistice France owed 1,970 million dollars to the United States and 1,682.8 million dollars
to Great Britain.5
While the history of Franco-American ﬁnancial relations in this period has stimulated
considerable scholarly interest, this is less true for Franco-British ﬁnancial relations. Martin
Horn’s Britain, France, and the ﬁnancing of the First World War sets out to redress the balance.
By charting the eﬀorts made by the British and French governments to co-operate in
ﬁnancing the joint war eﬀort, he reveals the deeply rooted suspicions which such eﬀorts
did little to overcome. The greatest source of irritation for the British was the French
reluctance to use their sizeable reserves of gold, which increased over the war years by
over £50 million, to ﬁnance war-time expenditure.
In the early stages of the war, the French had taken the decision to suspend the gold
standard on the condition, as stipulated by the Bank of France, that the franc would be
restored to convertibility at the end of hostilities at its pre-war value. However, with its
industrial heartland occupied by German troops, France’s import needs rose considerably
from 1914 onwards, while its capacity to pay for those imports with the proceeds from
exports was greatly curtailed. In the ﬁrst year of the war, France’s trade deﬁcit with Britain
rose more than six-fold. By 1916, it was forced to conclude the Calais Agreement with
Britain, which stipulated that the Bank of France had to ship gold to London in return for
a six-month subsidy from Britain. Even had France used its entire reserves of gold to
ﬁnance trade in 1916, this would not have been suﬃcient to cover the trade deﬁcit with
the United States alone in that year. In 1916, its trade deﬁcit with the United States was
thirteen times that of 1914. France needed to borrow money, but in trying to do so from
the United States it faced the problems of a low credit rating and the fact that it was
in competition with Britain for dollar loans.
Horn meticulously documents the attempts made by both governments to secure credits
from American banks in the ﬁrst two years of the war, the fears of the British that the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York had ambitions to replace the City of London as the
3 Denise Artaud, ‘Reparation and war debts : the restoration of French ﬁnancial power,
1919–1929’, in Robert Boyce, ed., French foreign and defence policy, 1918–1940: the decline and fall of a great
power (London, 1998) p. 90. 4 Ibid.
5 Harold G.Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky,War debts and world prosperity (Washington DC, 1952), p. 426.
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world’s ﬁnancial centre after the war, and the diﬃculties faced in trying to co-ordinate
purchasing in the United States. He argues that the failure to create a coherent inter-Allied
purchasing structure stemmed partly from justiﬁable French fears that the banking house
of J. P. Morgan & Co., preferred by the British government as the intermediary between
the Allies and Washington, identiﬁed with Britain rather than with France (p. 75). This was
related to the fear that Britain would control all Allied purchases and loans from neutral
countries for which France and Russia would provide the gold (p. 119). However, once the
United States joined the Allied war eﬀort, the concern that the war might be lost through
lack of foreign exchange disappeared.
At no point was there a fear that the French government would fail to raise the domestic
ﬁnance necessary for the war eﬀort. Given French citizens’ willingness to subscribe to war
loans, Horn argues that while the government might have made a greater eﬀort to raise
more money through taxation, this was a minor issue in comparison with the problem
of negotiating the foreign credits necessary to ﬁnance imports. It was the Allies’ success
in implementing unprecedented forms of ﬁnancial co-operation which, he claims, con-
tributed to their success in winning the war.
In agreeing to the suspension of the gold standard, the Bank of France had stipulated
that the convertibility of the franc should be restored as soon as possible after the war with
the franc at its pre-war value. This view was shared by most politicians, the Ministry of
Finance, journalists, and the ﬁnancial community. Yet as Kenneth Moure´ demonstrates
in his rigorous analysis, The gold standard illusion, there was no such consensus after the
war about how this was to be achieved. Drawing on the analysis of Barry Eichengreen,6
he stresses the political constraints on monetary policy. With the emergence of political
parties representing working-class constituencies, the Bank of France lost its immunity
from politics. Protection of the balance of payments was no longer acknowledged as the
primary objective of policy. Caught between the demands of the Bank of France for
deﬂationary policies, and political demands for increased public expenditure, successive
governments refused to vote the tax increases necessary to cover expenditure and bring
inﬂation under control. As a result, conﬁdence in their ability to manage the country’s
ﬁnances evaporated, and with it the value of the franc.
Thus while the level of domestic indebtedness may not have been a problem
for French governments during the First World War, as Horn argues, it proved to
be a major constraint on policy after the war. The reluctance of governments ﬁrst
to tax middle-class incomes and then, after 1917, to increase the rates of income tax to
ﬁnance the war and reconstruction in the belief that it was German taxpayers who should
foot the bill, unleashed inﬂationary pressure which was not brought under control until
1926.
In that year, with prices rising at an annualized rate of 350 per cent, Raymond Poincare´
was brought back to power as leader of a Union nationale coalition. In a chapter devoted
to Poincare´’s stabilization of the franc in the period 1926–8, Moure´ explains how Poincare´
managed to arrest inﬂation and restore the convertibility of the franc. Contemporaries
had stressed political factors as the explanation for Poincare´’s success ; in particular, the
conﬁdence which his leadership inspired which reversed the ﬂight of capital. Moure´
considers this explanation alongside those based either on the adoption of a more
regressive tax policy in which indirect taxes were increased and direct taxes reduced,
6 Barry Eichengreen, Golden fetters : the gold standard and the great depression, 1919–1939 (Oxford, 1995).
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or on the increase in interest rates and the creation of a fund – the Caisse autonome
d’amortissement – to control the ﬂoating debt. By consulting a range of archives, including
those of the Bank of France and the Ministry of Finance, he establishes that Poincare´
himself was opposed to the recommendations of a committee of experts set up in 1925 to
advise the government on the measures necessary to restore gold convertibility and
to balance the budget. Whereas the experts had advocated ratifying a war debt agreement
with the United States in order to negotiate further dollar credits – a measure which had
the support of Emile Moreau, governor of the Bank of France – Poincare´ preferred to
stabilize the franc more gradually without the help of foreign loans.
However, as Moure´ shows, it was the strong demand for francs after 1926 that enabled
the Bank of France to accumulate a suﬃciently large reserve of foreign exchange to ease
Moreau’s concern that without a dollar loan, stabilization would be impossible. But
Moreau did win the argument over the timing of the stabilization. Whereas Poincare´
would have preferred to delay the de jure stabilization until the franc had recovered more
of its pre-war value, pressure from Moreau compelled him to take the ﬁnal step in June
1928, when the franc was only one ﬁfth of its pre-war value. Ultimately both men knew
that conﬁdence in the franc depended not only on them working together, but also on
their being seen to be working together.
Once restored, it was the belief that the gold standard would contain further inﬂationary
pressures which then led subsequent French governments to pursue monetary policies
which starved other countries of the liquidity needed to reverse the depression after
1929. This belief, Moure´ argues, was based on a false understanding of how the gold
standard had worked in the period before the First World War. But to be guilty of mis-
understanding the rules of the previous game was not the same as being responsible for
causing the great depression – an accusation sometimes levied,7 wrongly in his view,
against France. Indeed, because the restored gold standard was not a symmetrical system
it was not as incumbent on France as a country in surplus to act as it was on countries
in deﬁcit, he argues. Furthermore, Moure´ claims that France probably adhered more
closely to the rules of the restored gold standard than did those countries such as Britain
which, with balance of payments deﬁcits, chose to leave the system.
The way in which the First World War was ﬁnanced had implications for welfare
reform as well, as Paul Dutton shows in his thorough and illuminating study Origins of
the French welfare state : the struggle for social reform in France, 1914–1947. The political choice
made by governments to borrow, rather than to increase taxes, to pay for the war
necessitated tough wage restrictions to contain the resulting inﬂationary pressure. The
industrial discontent which such measures provoked led to a wave of strikes (314 in 1916,
696 in 1917) and the belated introduction of income taxes in 1917. In those sectors of
industry vital to the war eﬀort such as munitions it also led to workers being oﬀered a
wage which took account of their family responsibilities. Known as the salaire vital (an
idea borrowed from the revolutionary war of 1793), the wage was divided into four parts.
The ﬁrst two parts, the base wage and merit pay, bore some relation to the worker’s
productivity. However the third and fourth parts, a cost-of-living stipend and a family
allowance, were based not on individual productivity, but on the worker’s social
circumstances. Thus, those with several children would get a higher wage than those
with fewer or no family responsibilities even when their productive activity was identical.
7 H. Clark Johnson, Gold, France and the great depression, 1919–1932 (New Haven, 1997).
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The rationale for the salaire vital was to quell labour dissatisfaction with the rising cost
of living at the least cost to the employer and the state. Its introduction marked a clear
breach of the principle of equal pay for equal work. The government also forced
through other family welfare measures in those industries in which it had monopsonistic
powers. These measures included a requirement that employers provide housing, cafe-
terias, shops, and nurseries for the use of their workers. This breach of the principle of
equal pay for equal work was acceptable in so far as it built on French concerns with
the country’s poor demographic performance. Until France’s defeat by Prussia in 1870
the slow growth of the French population in the nineteenth century had been viewed
positively as a way of improving per capita incomes. After 1870, it was held partly
responsible for the military defeat. Seizing their opportunity, social Catholics and
Radicals on the right of the political spectrum initiated a pro-natalist movement to
encourage women to have children and penalize those who did not. They promoted
family values based on a wholly domestic role for women, and opposed any expansion
of their civil and political rights. When income tax was introduced in 1917 it dis-
criminated against single people and couples without children. The family allowance
component of the salaire vital was paid to the head of the household (chef de famille). This
was almost always a man. Even when the man was mobilized his wife could not attain
the status of chef de famille, although she was eligible for family allowances. On the other
hand, a woman whose husband worked in a sector where family allowances were not
available, did not receive anything.
The irony was that once the war-time emergency was over and more competitive
conditions returned, these war-time measures discriminated against those ﬁrms which
employed men with family responsibilities, thereby threatening to exacerbate the demo-
graphic consequences of losing one and a half million men in the First World War. The
solution adopted was to set up a regional clearing house – caisse de compensation (an idea
spearheaded by Emile Romanet, a manager of the Regis-Joya metalworks in Grenoble) in
which all employers in an area could collectively share the costs of dependent children.
The threat of state intervention was often a strong enough stick to force ﬁrms to participate
in the regional caisses. In 1932, when the government legislated to ensure that all employers
would pay family allowances, employers still insisted that they, rather than the state, would
remain in control of its administration.
The way in which family allowances were handled served as a model for social insurance
as well. As Dutton explains, after the First World War, with the recovery of Alsace-
Lorraine, French legislators considered the adoption of German-style compulsory social
insurance throughout France. This was considered partly as a way of honouring the
promises made to troops, during a long and increasingly unpopular war, partly as a way
of reintegrating Alsace-Lorraine into France, and partly as a way of pacifying an increas-
ingly militant trade union movement. But whereas family allowances had been instigated
by the state during the war only to become a private movement in the 1920s, this was
not true of social insurance. Indeed, throughout the 1920s employers and workers
struggled for control over the country’s social welfare system. Both faced internal divisions.
The employers were split between those in Alsace and Lorraine who wanted to retain
the German system of compulsory social insurance, and those in the rest of France who
wanted a voluntary scheme run by themselves. In opposing the social insurance bills
under consideration in the 1920s, they oﬀered to include social insurance along with family
allowances in their caisses de compensation.
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The trade unions were also split on the issue. Both the Confe´de´ration ge´ne´rale du travail
(CGT) (socialist) and the Confe´de´ration ge´ne´rale du travail uniﬁe´e (communist) wanted family
allowances to be taken out of employers’ control and incorporated into a mandatory social
insurance system controlled by the state. However, a minority of their rank-and-ﬁle
members who had large families wanted to retain the existing system. The Confe´de´ration
franc¸aise du travail chre´tienne (Catholic) broadly supported the existing system of family al-
lowances but believed that all employers should be forced to join the caisses.
By 1928 when the franc was stabilized de jure at one ﬁfth of its pre-war value, the
government had a budget surplus which was larger in relation to gross national product
than at any time since 1870. This put it in a much stronger position to pass a social
insurance law which covered the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and short-
term unemployment. In 1932 it required all employers to join a caisse de compensation.
However, as Dutton explains, in the depressed economic conditions of 1930s France,
many artisanal and small commercial employers enrolled in caisses where the child
dependency ratio was exceptionally low, in order to reduce their contributions. In 1938,
the state proposed setting up a national compensation fund to equalize employer con-
tributions across caisses in France. This was taken up by Vichy. Pressure came both from
the caisses and from departments such as Brittany, which had higher than average birth-
rates, for compensation from those departments with lower than average birthrates.
Leaders of low-cost professional caisses, such as textiles, opposed any sort of national
compensation.
Dutton argues that Vichy leaders were much too close to the Grand patronat to impose a
solution. A proposal, drafted by Pierre Laroque, an oﬃcial working for the minister of
labour, Rene´ Belin (a former CGT oﬃcial) in summer 1940 advocated the abolition of all
800 social insurance caisses and their replacement by regional caisses, and the creation of a
single state institution under whose guidance a corporate organization of social welfare
could be placed in the future. The proposal, which was not welcomed by many employers,
was rejected by Pe´tain. Dismissed from oﬃce, Laroque then joined the Free French in
London and began working on another reform of French social welfare. Appointed by de
Gaulle as leader of the newly created Direction ge´ne´rale de la se´curite´ sociale in early 1945,
Laroque spearheaded the legislation which in October 1945 was to launch France’s post-
war welfare state.
As part of Laroque’s reforms of the system of social security, local family allowance
caisses and social insurance caisses were to be managed by representatives of the beneﬁci-
aries, which in practice meant the CGT. The system was to be extended to cover all
citizens, through payroll levies and state subsidies, and rates were to be increased. The
employer caisses de compensation for family allowances were to be integrated into the Caisse
national de se´curite´ sociale. While the employers were in no position to oppose the integration
of family allowances, pro-natalist and family groups, despite their association with Vichy,
managed to tap into continuing fears of depopulation in order to oppose it. De Gaulle
himself opposed it. He also maintained the divisions between industrial and rural France
by placing responsibility for agricultural family allowances and social insurance in the
hands of the minister of agriculture, rather than in the hands of the Direction ge´ne´rale de la
se´curite´ sociale. A new national medical insurance system set tariﬀs with the agreement of
doctors’ associations for the most common medical procedures, so that a patient could be
reimbursed about 80 per cent of costs. Where Laroque’s reforms really failed, in Dutton’s
view, was in creating a uniﬁed social security system in which middle-class professionals
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would contribute alongside working-class employees. In 1948, four separate regimes were
set up, based on diﬀerent socio-professional categories.
Since family allowances and social insurance beneﬁts were initially paid to men in their
capacity as chefs de famille, the system as it was established initially discriminated against
many women. In her book Fathers, families and the state in France, 1914–1945, Kristen Childers
focuses in this context not on how women were treated by the state, but on how men
were treated. Starting with the debates about the role of men in the family and in society
initiated during the French Revolution, she traces oﬃcial attitudes towards men, as
‘gendered beings ’, throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. The
central focus of her book is on the Vichy regime, when the contradictions in oﬃcial
attitudes towards men were most marked.
For much of the nineteenth century, as Childers explains, paternal authority, as
enshrined in the Napoleonic Code, was seen as necessary to ensure the stability of
the nation. This authority was gradually eroded by the forces of industrialization
and urbanization but also, in the aftermath of defeat in the Franco-Prussian War,
by concerns about the low birthrate. This latter concern led to the legalization of divorce
in 1885 and, in 1896, to the formation of the Alliance nationale pour l’accroissement de la
population. Propaganda for introducing an eight-hour working day focused from the
1880s onwards on the advantages to the family of giving fathers extra time to be involved
in the education of their children. Houses and gardens were to be redesigned to provide
space for the father to read and to grow food for the family, thereby enhancing his sense
of worth.
As the issue of paternity rose to prominence at the end of the nineteenth century, pro-
natalists were quick to condemn men, even more than women, for the selﬁsh behaviour
which they claimed was leading to the depopulation of France. Yet in outlawing contra-
ception after the First World War, conservative politicians in the Bloc national which
dominated parliament were careful to outlaw female but not male forms. Whilst the
French Senate voted on three occasions, in 1919, 1925, and 1932, against granting even
partial voting rights to women, there were a number of deputies who were in favour of
giving fathers extra votes. Indeed, the idea that fathers should be given additional votes to
represent their wives and children was a recurrent demand of many pro-natalist groups
from the 1920s through to the French Resistance.
Instead of getting extra votes, men were given ﬁnancial incentives to become fathers.
Childers analyses the background to the package of laws known as the Code de famille passed
by the government of Edouard Daladier (not a father himself) on 29 July 1939. These
included a bonus of twice the average departmental salary for a ﬁrst child born to a
couple within two years of marriage. The Code made demography a compulsory part
of the national curriculum in schools and enforced stricter penalties for abortion and
pornography.
This was a prelude to the pro-family propaganda launched by the traditionalists in the
Vichy regime. Here Childers assembles a rich array of images of fatherhood drawn from
exhibitions, magazines, and conferences of the period 1940 to 1944, which, taken together,
present a confused picture of how fathers were to appear and act in a regenerated France.
She makes much of the contrast between images of the strong virile heroic male held up as
the new man of the National Revolution, and the reality of defeated soldiers returning
home or being sent to work in Germany as forced labour. In setting up the Ecole nationale
des cadres d’Uriage, the Vichy state hoped to create a new breed of French elite which
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would act as a catalyst for changing French society. But even this educational initiative
was unable to overcome the apparent contradictions between being a good father and
giving everything to the country.
While governments of the Fourth Republic shared Vichy’s pro-natalist policies, Childers
claims that the emphasis of policy shifted after 1945 away from deﬁning a role for fathers,
to focus on promoting the welfare of mothers and children within the family. This new
emphasis was part of a package of reforms which included giving women the right to
vote, creating the welfare state, and deﬁning a more interventionist role for the state in
the economy, under a national plan. Some of the reforms sprang directly from debates
within the resistance movement which became enshrined in the Charter of the Conseil
national de la re´sistance.8 Although France had emerged from the Second World War with
its gold and foreign exchange reserves intact (unlike the situation in 1918) the ﬁrst plan,
known as the Monnet Plan, was predicated on securing a dollar loan from the United
States to restore France as a great power.9 As a result the Resistance Council’s demands
for the institution of an economic and social democracy in France were not central to the
form of economic planning set up in 1946. They were central, however, to the new forms
of worker participation in decision-making analysed by Adam Steinhouse.
The introduction of this reform in 1945 owed much, he claims, to the special circum-
stances of post-liberation France. Employers who had been deeply opposed to any form of
worker participation in decision-making were now, as a result of their collaboration
with the German occupiers during the war, largely discredited and silenced. On the other
hand, the main trade union, the communist-led Confe´de´ration ge´ne´rale du travail, emerged
strengthened and reinforced from its participation in the Resistance. Now seen by the state
as having an essential role to play in restoring and expanding production, it followed
the communist party line in eschewing its pre-war revolutionary stance, and abandoned
its traditional opposition to any form of participation in state structures or co-operation
with management.
Taking advantage of the window of opportunity which the change in political power
and attitudes oﬀered, the government gave new rights to workers to participate in the
decision-making of ﬁrms by setting up comite´s d’entreprise in ﬁrms with a labour force of 100
or more. Although the scope of the legislation was extended in 1946 to cover ﬁrms with a
workforce of ﬁfty or more, by 1948 the reforms had become inoperable. Among the reasons
identiﬁed by Steinhouse for their failure were the refusal of employers, despite their Vichy
record, to accept worker participation; internal divisions and a lack of commitment to the
reforms within the CGT; and the preference of a centralized state for a form of economic
planning which did not extend to the level of the ﬁrm.
Ultimately though, it was, he claims, the weakness of the CGT, which represented
the interests of the skilled male component of the labour force often at the expense of its
female and immigrant members, which was responsible for the marginalization of French
workers from decision-making in ﬁrms. This, he asserts, was a more powerful factor
than the political and ﬁnancial pressure exerted by the United States through the agencies
of the Marshall Plan, which led to the division of the CGT and the formation of the
non-communist Force ouvrie`re at the end of 1947.
8 Shennan, Rethinking France.
9 Frances M. B. Lynch, France and the international economy: from Vichy to the Treaty of Rome
(London, 1997).
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This was to mark a turning-point in French labour history and industrial relations, since
from 1948 onwards French labour was to be excluded from decision-making at both
national and enterprise level. This was in clear contrast to the strength of trade union
representation in the corporatist solutions adopted elsewhere in continental Europe.
Among the many reforms introduced after the Second World War, Steinhouse has chosen
to analyse one which failed. What emerges from the other books reviewed here is that
the more successful policies in the ﬁelds of welfare reform and demography owed more
to the legacy of the First World War and the interwar experience than to the impact of
the Second World War on France.
F R ANC E S M. B. L Y NCHUN I V E R S I T Y O F WE S TM I N S T E R
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